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Studies of category-specific disorders have suggested that categories of living 
and non-living things vary in the properties that are most salient to recognition. 
Studies of the object features generated by normal adults have also revealed different 
patterns of responses to different categories. These adult patterns are likely to 
originate in childhood, but there are few reports of children’s verbal conceptions of 
objects and none at present of objects from different categories. This paper 
investigates the development of object conceptions, in large group of children, aged 
3years 7months to 11years 6 months, in response to ‘What is a - ?” questions directed 
to seventy-two objects, selected from two categories of Living Things (animals and 
fruit/vegetables) and two categories of Artefacts (implements and vehicles). 
Proportions of perceptual-to-functional features provided by the children to living and 
non-living things varied with the range of features defined as functions, just as studies 
of adults have found. Apart from the distribution of superordinate responses, which 
were significantly more salient to living than to non-living categories, no other 
property separated the two categories. Only the category of implements could be 
distinguished from the other categories on the basis of the features generated. It is 
argued that the perceptual-functional of theory of category-specific disorders receives 
little support from this study, but that in general the distribution of features generated 
by young children is similar that produced by normal adults.  

Numerous studies of adults with semantic memory impairments have reported 
difficulties with naming and defining objects belonging to particular categories of 
objects. Although it is possible that many of these cases arise as artefacts from the use 
of uncontrolled materials (Stuart, Parkin and Hunkin, 1992; Funnell and Sheridan, 
1992; Gaffan and Heywood, 1993), the attempt to account for these disorders has 
stimulated an important debate about the mental representations underlying different 
object categories.  
The most commonly reported category-specific impairments affect the naming 
and recognition of objects belonging to categories of living things, such as animals 
and fruits and vegetables. To account for this bias, it has been suggested that 
knowledge of the perceptual features of objects is particularly important for the 
recognition of living things - and also for some artefacts, such as musical instruments 
and buildings - so that when perceptual knowledge is impaired, these categories will 
be most affected. Sometimes, however, objects belonging mainly to nonliving 
categories, such as tools, are most impaired, and in these cases, functional information 
is thought to be particularly salient, so that, when functional knowledge is damaged, 
the recognition of small manipulable objects (but not larger objects such as vehicles 
and buildings) will be impaired (Warrington and Shallice 1984;Warrington and 
McCarthy, 1987).  
Underlying the perceptual-functional theory of category specific impairments 
is the assumption that perceptual and functional knowledge are represented in such a 
way that each may be damaged more or less independently of the other. In line with 
this assumption, Miller and Johnson Laird (1976), Johnson Laird (1983) and 
Jackendoff (1987) distinguish between perceptual and conceptual representations of 
objects. They suggest that knowledge of the shape of objects is stored in perceptual 
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paradigms that are involved in the creation of mental models of the three-dimensional 
world. Perceptual paradigms can be used to test a percept, or to describe an object 
verbally, while mental models can be used to compute images that represent the 
perceptible features of real world objects, indicating an interactive relationship 
between mental representations of perceptual and conceptual properties. In contrast to 
perceptual features, functional features are considered to be conceptual (Miller and 
Johnson Laird, 1976; Jackendoff, 1987) and are particularly critical aspects of most 
artefacts and more basic than object form (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976). Function 
has been proposed to determine the nature of the perceptual features of artefacts 
(Miller and Johnson Laird, 1976; Tyler, Moss, Durrant-Peatfield and Levy, 2000; 
Borgo and Shallice, 2001), and, as Miller and Johnson Laird (1976) and Johnson 
Laird (1983) have suggested, it is the use to which artefacts can be put that appears to 
distinguish them from living things.   
Empirical evidence has supported these theoretical distinctions to some extent. 
A study that defined function narrowly, as ‘what an object if used for’, found that 
perceptual properties dominated dictionary definitions of living things by a ratio of 7 
perceptual to 1 functional property, while a ratio of 3 perceptual to 2 functional 
properties for artefacts reflected a closer balance between the two (Farah and 
McClelland, 1991). Similar ratios of perceptual to functional features were found 
when normal adults were asked to generate features to living and nonliving things 
(McRae, de Sa and Seidenberg, 1997). Moreover, when computer simulations of a 
model based upon these ratios of perceptual to functional features were carried out, 
damage to perceptual features produced impairments to living things, while damage to 
functional features produced impairments to non-living things, consistent with the 
perceptual/functional hypothesis (Farah and McClelland, 1991). 
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However, further studies have shown that the dominance of perceptual 
features to the representations of living things depends upon the range of features 
included in the ‘functional’ category. When dictionary definitions of function were 
broadened to include all non-sensory properties, the relative dominance of perceptual 
knowledge in the representations of living things virtually disappeared (Caramazza 
and Shelton, 1998). When actions and activities were included, as well as object use, 
normal adults generated more perceptual than functional features to both living and 
nonliving things (Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Hodges and Patterson, 2001); and, when 
associative information was combined with function, the proportion of sensory to 
functional features was reduced particularly to living things, because living things 
generated more encyclopaedic properties. Using three different definitions of 
function, ranging from a narrow view (what it is used for) to the widest view that 
included all non-sensory features, McRae and Cree (2002) concluded that only the 
narrowest definition, which produced ratios of 6.4:1 sensory to function features for 
living things, and 2.2:1 features for nonliving things, distinguished between the 
categories.  
Garrard et al (2001) used cluster analysis to determine category membership 
on the basis of the features generated to a mixed set of objects, and found three broad 
domains of objects: fruit, animate beings and artefacts. These semantic categories 
were argued to ‘emerge’ from the overlapping patterns of object features shared by 
the members in the set, as noted earlier by Rosch and Mervis (1975). A similar study, 
that described the properties generated to selected categories, found that creatures 
were characterised by many perceptual properties (such as colour and shape), many 
activities, and few functions (defined as the object’s use); fruit and vegetables were 
characterised by many perceptual features and some functional features (eg people 
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cook them); and a collection of non-living things were characterised by many 
functions but few perceptual features (McRae and Cree 2002; Cree and McRea, 
2003).  These studies suggest that detailed analyses of the range of properties 
generated to a selection of different categories may reveal more information about the 
salience of particular properties than do broad comparisons between categories of 
living and non-living things.    
The question that concerns this paper is whether or not the various patterns of 
features generated across categories, reported by Garrard et al (2001) and McRae and 
Cree (2002), have their origins in childhood.  Computational modelling of 
development has suggested that early experience shapes the developing system with 
long lasting effects (Plaut and Shallice, 1993; Ellis and Lambon Ralph, 2001). In 
addition, differences in the age-of-acquisition of object names have been found to 
influence response time and accuracy in visual object naming tasks (eg Carroll and 
White, 1973; Gilhooly and Gilhooly, 1979; Brown and Watson, 1987; Morrison, Ellis 
and Quinlan, 1992), and to affect response time in some conceptual studies in adults 
(Van Loon-Vervoon, 1989; Brysbaert, Van Wijnendaele and De Deyne, 2000; 
Ghyselinck, 2002), although not others (Morrison, Ellis and Quinlan, 1992). Where 
age-of -acquisition effects occur, it suggests that representations laid down in 
childhood are likely to be involved, leading to the prediction that category-specific 
feature patterns similar to those observed in adults will be evident in children’s data.   
Studies of children’s conceptual knowledge of objects have not so far reported 
comparisons across objects belonging to different categories, but a handful of studies 
have investigated children’s knowledge of object properties. Based upon evidence 
from responses to ‘What is a - ?’ questions, McGregor, Friedman, Reilly and Newman 
(2002) found that the core concepts of objects held by children aged between 4y2m to 
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6y6m contained both functional and perceptual properties. Functional properties were 
defined broadly as ‘the purpose of the item, the people or instruments that act on the 
item, the way it is acted on, or the outcome of the item’s actions’, and perceptual 
properties as ‘physical properties, including colour, shape, smell, feel, composition, 
life cycle, and movement’, and the authors argued that only when object concepts 
contain knowledge of both perceptual and functional properties could objects be 
accurately identified by name.  
However, in other studies, functional responses (defined as ‘what an object is 
for’) have been reported to dominate the responses made by children aged between 
4y5m and 7y5m to the definitional questions contained in the WPPSI and WISC-R 
(Litowitz (1977); and to responses across four age groups of children (5y2m, 7y4m, 
9y4m and11y6m) when function was defined as ‘an object’s use or an action it could 
perform’ (Wehren, De Lisi, and Arnold (1981). In the latter study, the proportion of 
functional responses decreased as responses containing combinations of response 
types increased with age; but purely perceptual responses (referred to as ‘concrete’ 
concepts) were consistently low in number across the age groups. This finding might 
reflect the dominance of artefacts in the set, since 32% of the perceptual responses 
produced were elicited by one item ‘tree’: the only living thing presented.  
Linguistically, categories are distinguished by the use of superordinate terms.  
McRae and Cree (2002) found that adults are more likely to generate a superordinate 
label in response to animal names than to any other category except fruit and 
vegetables. Similarly, adults with semantic memory disorders are more likely to give 
superordinate responses to living things than to artefacts in naming and definition 
tasks (Funnell and de Mornay Davies, 1996; Moss, Tyler, Durrant Peatfield and Bunn 
1998). Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem (1976) observed that objects 
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belonging to biological categories share more features at the superordinate level, and 
therefore form tighter categories than other groups of objects. If these categories 
develop earlier, this might be reflected in the earlier use of the related superordinate 
terms. Rosch et al (1976) found that although children of 5 years 7months could sort 
both animals and vehicles on the basis of category, and could provide the 
superordinate term for the animals, fewer than 20% of vehicles were described by a 
superordinate term, providing some support for the view that some objects form 
categories more readily than others and that these differences can be observed in the 
response patterns established during early childhood.   
There is general agreement in the children’s literature that the ‘best’ 
definitions contain a superordinate term and some specific information (Litowitz, 
1977; Benelli, Arcuri and Marchesini;1987; Johnson and Anglin, 1995; Kurland and 
Snow, 1997). Watson (1985) found that the question ‘What kind of thing is a …?’ 
elicited more superordinate terms than a non-specific probe question. However, 
children’s definitions, particularly at young ages, often fail to include a known 
superordinate (Watson,1995; Snow,1990; Johnson and Anglin,1995). The use of 
superordinate terms by children has been found to increase with age. This may occur 
for a variety of reasons: because older children have greater knowledge of words; 
because they have better organised concepts; because they are more aware of the 
conventional use of the superordinate term in definitions; or because they benefit from 
an academic culture (Skwarchuk and Anglin,1997; Kurland and Snow, 1997; Snow, 
1990).  
Children younger than ten years are argued to find it difficult to cope with the 
cognitive demands of a formal definition requiring the combination of a category 
label and some specific information (McGhee Bidlack (1991), and even ten year old 
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children produce such definitions for only 70% of object names presented (Kurland 
and Snow (1997). As children grow older, explicit superordinate terms (eg tool) begin 
to replace broad superordinate terms such as ‘thing’ and ‘something’ (McGhee 
Bidlack, 1991; Skwarchuk and Anglin, 1997). Interestingly, definitions given by ten-
year-old children were not found to differ significantly from those of adults (Benelli, 
Arcuri and Marchesini, 1988; Kurland and Snow, 1997). However, as mentioned 
above, there is evidence to suggest that the use of superordinate terms by children 
may vary across category (Rosch et al, 1976): a finding that, if supported further, 
would undermine the view that the use of superordinate terms depends entirely upon 
developmental level.  
This study reports an investigation into the different types of knowledge 
provided by a large group of primary school children, aged between 3years 7 months 
and 11 years 6 months, in response to ‘What is a-?’ questions. Such questions ensure 
that the responses given by the children are those that occur naturally to them and 
presumably contain the most salient information. Objects were selected from four 
categories – animals, fruit/vegetables, implements, and vehicles - that differ in 
animacy, visual similarity, and manipulability. Living things are considered to be 
more perceptually similar to each other (Humphreys, Riddoch and Quinlan, 1988; 
Gaffan and Heywood, 1993), and to share more attributes in common at the 
superordinate level than do non-living things (Rosch et al, 1976). Implements are 
considered to be more manipulable than vehicles and animals (McCarthy and 
Warrington, 1988), and the perceptual similarity of motor patterns has been found to 
serve as common attributes in the construction of categories at the basic level (Rosch 
et al (1976).  
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Predictions based upon theories of object representations suggest that 
perceptual information should dominate children’s responses to living things 
(Warrington and Shallice, 1983; Farah and McClelland, 1991) and to non-
manipulable artefacts such as vehicles (McCarthy and Warrington, 1988). In contrast, 
if functional knowledge is critical to the representations of artefacts (Miller and 
Johnson-Laird, 1976), these should dominate responses to manipulable objects in 
particular. Superordinate responses are expected to be more common to living things 
although the developmental literature suggests that the use of superordinate responses 
in general emerges with increasing age. Empirical evidence obtained from normal 
adults indicates that there may be contributions from further features, such as 
‘encyclopaedic information’, and ‘activities’ to consider (Garrard et al, 2001; McRae 
and Cree, 2002) if the responses given by adults have their antecedents in childhood.  
Finally, according to Mandler (1997), young infants can form perceptual categories 
with no conceptual content. On this view, it might be expected that the features of 
objects that the youngest children in the sample produce should be mainly perceptual. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 Method 
Participants 
The study involved 288 children, aged between 3 years 7 months and 11 years 6 
months. All the children spoke English as a first language and no one had an official 
statement of special needs. There were 36 children in any twelve-month age group 
and three boys and three girls in every two-month age band. The children were 
selected from eight state-maintained schools: one located in Inner London, five in 
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Outer London, and two in the Home Counties. The full age range was tested at all 
schools except the Inner London school where testing began at five years.  
 
Materials 
Eighteen objects, of varying difficulty, were selected for each of the four categories of 
animals, fruit/vegetables, implements and vehicles. Using measures of objective age-
of-acquisition of naming (Morrison, Chappell and Ellis, 1997), and evidence of 
knowledge acquisition from a pilot study (reported in Funnell, Hughes and 
Woodcock, 2004), we selected for each category 3 objects with names or knowledge 
acquired before 3 years; 3 objects acquired after 11 years; and 3 objects acquired in 
each of the age ranges 3–5 years; 5-7 years; 7–9 years and 9–11 years. The seventy-
two test items were ranked in approximate age-of-acquisition, and were ordered so 
that no more than two items from the same category appeared in succession. 
 
Procedure 
Children were seen individually on two or three separate occasions, in a quiet place at 
school.  Each spoken object name was introduced as part of a general spoken 
question, ‘What is a - ?’ and the child’s response was noted. This question was 
followed by five probe questions (reported in Funnell et al, 2004) that were designed 
to elicit specific knowledge. A child was considered to have reached ceiling for a 
particular category when four successive items, or a total of six items from that 
category, failed to elicit any correct responses to the probe questions. No more items 
from that category were then given. Testing continued until the child reached ceiling, 
or the final item, in all four categories. 
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 Results 
a) Scoring 
Children did not always respond to ‘What is a - ?’ questions. However, even the 
youngest children 3y 7m – 4y 6m made sufficient responses (N = 705) to warrant 
analysis. The number of responses increased steadily with age, reaching a total of 
2,076 responses in the oldest age group. Although the total number of responses 
varied across age, the mean percentage of responses in each category was virtually 
constant across age: animals 26.7 (sd 1.6); fruit/vegetables 25.7 (1.9); implements 
24.4 (1.5); and vehicles 23.2 (1.3).  
Children’s responses were classified into five groups: superordinate, 
perceptual, factual, functional and action. A response was classed as a superordinate 
when applied appropriately as a category label. We accepted animal and creature for 
all types of animals, and mammal, marsupial, bird, and insect when appropriately 
applied. For fruit/vegetables we accepted plant, fruit, vegetables when appropriately 
applied, but we accepted any of these terms for tomato, aubergine, courgette (which 
are technically fruits) and rhubarb (which is technically a vegetable). Implement, tool, 
and machine were accepted as superordinate terms for implements; and for vehicles, 
we accepted transport, vehicle, machine, and boat (for water craft only).  
We defined perceptual responses as named features that could be seen, heard, 
felt or tasted: for example, ‘A cow says “moo”’; ‘A giraffe’s got a long neck’; A 
lemon is sour’. This is a ‘tighter’ definition of perceptual responses than that used by 
McGregor et al (2002), who included life cycle in their list of otherwise physical 
properties of objects, but one that conforms to adult studies that limit definitions of 
perceptual properties to those attributes that can be processed by a sensory modality, 
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such as colour and shape (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Garrard et al, 2001; McCrae 
and Cree, 2002).   
Factual responses referred to encyclopaedic information: e.g. ‘A koala lives in 
Australia’; information about an animal’s behaviour: e.g. ‘A beaver blocks water with 
sticks’; and information that could not be deduced from visual inspection of the 
object: e.g.  ‘A submarine has missiles’. Garrard et al (2001) used a similar definition 
of encyclopaedic knowledge, which they describe as associative, giving as examples 
‘A tiger is found in India’ and  ‘A toaster is kept in the kitchen’.  
We chose to define function narrowly, as the ‘the purpose of objects’ (eg ‘A 
spanner’s for undoing nuts’), because studies with adults have found that this feature 
distinguishs best between categories of living things and non-living things (Farah and 
McClelland, 1991; McRae and Cree, 2001). We treated action as a separate type of  
knowledge, defining it as ‘What is done to objects in the process of using them’, as, 
for example, the comment “You twist it around” that was given as a response to the 
word ‘spanner’.  Some studies of adults (Garrod et al, 2001; Caramazza and Shelton, 
1998)) have included action in the definition of function, as have studies of children 
(McGregor et al, 2002; Wehren, De Lisi, and Arnold, 1981), but we were concerned 
to explore the individual contribution that action might bring to implements compared 
with other categories (McCarthy and Warrington, 1988).  
Responses that provided irrelevant information were not included in the 
analysis but, because our analysis was directed to collecting information about the 
types of responses that children gave, we included a few instances of plausible 
information e.g. ‘a penguin has a fur coat’, and information relating to close semantic 
neighbours e.g. ‘a microscope’s for looking at the stars’.   
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In this analysis, we were interested in the type of information volunteered and 
how this might change over age, in contrast to most adult studies that have calculated 
the total number of features produced of each type. For this reason we awarded a 
single information point to each type of feature (i.e. superordinate, perceptual, 
functional, factual or action) that was produced in a single response. However, a small 
number of children repeatedly produced groups of shared perceptual features such as 
‘Its got legs, it’s got fur’, to several animals. Also, a very small proportion of factual, 
functional and action responses included multiple examples of the same type. For 
example, the word ‘spoon’ elicited two pieces of functional information “It’s for 
stirring and eating ice cream”; and the word ‘corkscrew’ elicited three actions “You 
drill it into wine bottle, you turn the handle, and you pull.” In all these cases, the 
feature set was counted as a single information point. This method of analysis allows 
changes in the proportion of a particular response type over age, to be expressed as 
changes in the proportion of children producing that type of response.  
 
b) Data analysis 
Children were treated as subjects in this analysis. First, we calculated the 
number of each child’s information points for each of the five types of response to the 
objects in each category. We then calculated each response type as a proportion of the 
total information points given by the child to that category. These data formed the 
basis of each of the following four analyses. 
 
Analysis of all object categories combined. 
Our first analysis examined the proportions of response types made by 
children in each age group, collapsed across category. Figure 1a shows that the 
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proportion of non-perceptual responses (that is, functional, factual and action 
responses combined) significantly outnumbered perceptual responses (repeated 
measures ANOVA: F (1,280 = 352.6, p < 0.001): a difference that is apparent across 
the age range. Figure 1b presents the same data but with the different types of non-
perceptual responses plotted separately.  Using repeated measures ANOVA, we found 
a main effect of response type F (4,277) = 42.84, p < 0.001, in which pair-wise 
comparisons show that more children gave superordinate responses than any other 
type of response. Perceptual responses did not differ in proportion to functional 
responses, but both were more numerous than factual responses, which, in turn, were 
more numerous than actions (all differences p < 0.001).  
There was also an interaction with age and response type (F (28,1120) = 7.74, 
p < 0.001). Action responses, which were prominent in the youngest children’s 
responses, declined over age and were the least likely response after 6 years 6 months. 
In contrast, superordinate terms increased with age relative to other response types: 
these were the least likely response before the age of 5y7m but the most likely 
response in all following age groups. These initial results, which will be qualified 
later, support the view that superordinate responses are infrequent in children below 
five years of age, and increase slowly to reach a sub-optimal level (in this study less 
than 55%) of response types in older children of 10+ years.   
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Analysis across living and non-living things. 
  Our second analysis examined the proportions of response types given to non-
living things and nonliving things. Figure 2a presents the proportion of responses to 
living things with all non-perceptual response types combined. A repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant effect of response type (F (1.71,280) = 61.3, p < 
0.001). Pair-wise comparisons showed that children produced significantly higher 
proportions of superordinate responses than non-perceptual responses, which 
significantly outnumbered perceptual responses (all comparisons p< 0.001). When 
overall numbers, rather than proportions of perceptual and non-perceptual responses 
were counted, non-perceptual features outnumbered perceptual features by a ratio of 4  
to 3.   
Figure 2b) presents the proportions of all types of responses given to living 
things. Using repeated measures ANOVA, we again found a significant effect of 
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response type F(2.01, 280) = 237.1, p<0.001). Pair-wise comparisons revealed 
significant differences (p < 0.001) between each response type in which the 
proportion of response type descended in the following order:  superodinate > 
perceptual> factual > action > functional. As Figure 2b) shows, children of all ages 
produced more perceptual and fewer functional responses to living things than any 
other response type. When numbers of responses types were counted, perceptual 
responses outnumbered functional responses to living things by a ratio of 7 to 1.  
Turning to non-living things, Figure 2c presents the proportion of 
superordinate, perceptual and non-perceptual responses combined. There was a 
significant effect of response type (repeated measures ANOVA (1.65,280) = 747.64, p 
< 0.001). Pair-wise comparisons revealed significant differences between all response 
types, in which the proportions of non-perceptual responses outnumbered those of 
perceptual responses, which in turn outnumbered superordinate responses. Counting 
the overall numbers of responses given, non-perceptual responses outnumbered 
perceptual responses to nonliving things by a ratio of 7 to2.  
Figure 2d presents the proportions of non-perceptual responses given to non-
living things differentiated according to type. Again, we found a significant effect of 
response type (F (21.8,280) = 7.52, p <0.001). Pair-wise comparisons revealed that 
overall proportions of superordinate responses were significantly lower than all other 
response types. Functional responses significantly outnumbered perceptual responses, 
and these significantly outnumbered factual responses, which did not differ from 
factual responses. As Figure 2d shows, proportions of functional responses exceeded 
perceptual and action responses in all but the youngest age group. Counting numbers 
rather than proportions of responses, functional responses outnumbered perceptual 
responses to non-living things by a ratio of 2 to 1.  
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In summary, this analysis has shown that perceptual properties dominate 
FIGURE 2 
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responses to living things when compared with functional responses, but this 
domination disappears when functional responses are combined with other non-
perceptual response types. In contrast, both functional and non-perceptual properties 
combined dominate the responses to non-living things.  
 
Analysis by individual category 
Our third analysis investigated the proportion of response types within each 
category made by children at different ages. The findings are presented in Figure 3. 
Separate related MANOVAs revealed a main effect of response type for each 
category (Animals F (3,276) = 788.13); Fruit/vegetables F(4,275) = 1162.28; 
Implements F (4,275) = 381.76; Vehicles F (4,273) = 49.61: all significant at p < 
0.001. To control for the number of comparisons made in subsequent analyses, the 
results are considered to be significant if the F contrast exceeds the critical F at a 
probability of 0.05 or more. In all these comparisons, significance can be assumed to 
be at the p = 0.001 level unless otherwise stated.  
For animals, superordinate responses significantly outnumbered all other 
response types (t = -12.55; Fcont. = 157.5 > Fcrit. = 16.26), and the proportion 
increased markedly with age. Perceptual and factual responses significantly 
outnumbered functional responses (t = 19.15; Fcont. =  366.7 > Fcrit. = 13.82), which 
failed to reach 10% in any age group. No action responses were made.  
For fruit/vegetables, superordinate responses again significantly outnumbered 
all other responses (t = 17.37; Fcont. = 301.7 > Fcrit. 18.48) and increased markedly 
with age. Perceptual responses did not differ in proportion from action responses and 
there was no interaction with age. However, proportions of perceptual and action 
responses exceeded proportions of factual and functional responses (t = 18.18, Fcont. 
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= 330.5 > Fcrit. = 16.26), and there was a significant age by response type interaction 
(t = -10.38; Fcont. = 107.7 > Fcrit. = 44.7) reflecting decreases in proportions of 
perceptual and action responses with age. Factual and functional responses differed in 
proportion (t = 7.57; Fcont. = 57.3 > Fcrit. = 16.26), but there was no interaction with 
age.      
For implements, the proportions of functional responses exceeded action 
responses in all but the youngest age group ( t = 17.35; Fcont. = 301.02 > Fcrit. = 
16.26), and exceeded all other response types. Action responses also exceeded 
perceptual responses (t = -4.1; Fcont. = 16.81 > Fcrit. = 16.26). There was a 
significant age by response type interaction between superordinate and other response 
types (t = -8.12; Fcont. = 65.93 > Fcrit. 59.64). Finally, for vehicles, action responses 
were significantly inferior to perceptual/factual/functional response types (t = 13.2; 
Fcont. = 173.7 > Fcrit. = 16.26), and there was a significant age by response type 
interaction between superordinate and other response types (t = -10.2; F cont. = 104.0 
> Fcrit. = 59.6).  
In summary, the profiles of response types differed for each category. Factual 
and perceptual responses characterised responses to animals from the earliest age, 
superordinate responses increased markedly with age, functional responses were 
consistently low across age, and action responses were never made. Action and 
perceptual responses were most marked for fruits and vegetables, and action 
responses were particularly marked at the youngest ages; superordinate responses 
increased markedly with age, and proportions of factual and functional responses 
were consistently low. Functional responses characterised implements across the age 
range, action responses were prominent in the youngest age groups, perceptual and 
factual responses were produced at low levels, and superordinate responses increased 
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slowly with age. Finally, action responses were the least common response to 
vehicles; while proportions of perceptual, factual and functional responses did not 
differ, and superordinate responses increased slowly over age.  
FIGURE 3 
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Analysis by response type 
Our final analysis investigated each response type in turn, examining the 
relative proportions of each type of response produced in each category (see Figure 
4).  As before, differences between contrast F and critical F were used to establish 
significance that can be assumed to be at the p = 0.001 level unless otherwise stated. 
As Figure 4a shows, proportions of superordinate responses to animals and 
fruit/vegetables significantly outnumbered other categories of artefacts (t = 27.16; F 
cont. = 739.9 > Fcrit. = 16.26). Superordinate responses increased sharply from 
around 10% at the youngest age to over 75%, and produced a significant age by 
category interaction (t = 10.0; F cont. = 100.6 > Fcrit. = 44.7).  
In both categories there was a noticeable spurt in the proportion of 
superordinate responses between 4y7m and 6y6m. Relatively few superordinate terms 
were produced for implements and vehicles, which increased slowly from close to 
zero at the youngest age to less than 40% by the end of the age range. Clearly, the 
marked superiority of superordinate responses, reported in the combined analysis (see 
Figure 1b), was supported in the main by the responses made to the living categories.  
Examples of definitions comprising a superordinate term accompanied by a 
qualifying statement were evident from an early age. Three children in the youngest 
age group produced such definitions to animals (for example, “A big animal with a 
very long neck; it’s blacky yellow” in response to giraffe); and two children in this 
age group produced such definitions to fruits/vegetables (for example, “Fruit, you eat 
them” in response to the word ‘grapes’). Definitions of this type did not appear in 
response to vehicles and implements until a later age. Three children produced a 
definition for at least one vehicle at age 5y7m to 6y6m (for example, “A machine for 
soldiers, it shoots bombs” to the word ‘tank’) and three children aged 6y7m to 7y6m, 
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defined at least one implement (for example, “A tool, its flat at the front. You try to 
get stuff off with it” to the word ‘chisel’). Thus the children’s use of a superordinate 
term, with or without a qualifying statement, varies with the nature of the category.    
Analyses of the remaining response-types, using related MANOVA, showed 
FIGURE 4 
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an effect of category (Perceptual  F(3,271) = 47.46; Factual F (3,271) = 166.86; 
Functional F(3,271) = 655.40; Action F (2,272) = 45.24; all significant at p < 0.001), 
and each showed a different profile (see Figures 4b-e). Further analysis  of each 
feature type revealed the following characteristics (Fcont exceeding Fcrit at the p = 
0.001 level unless otherwise stated).  
The perceptual responses, shown in Figure 4b, were significantly lower to 
implements than to all other categories (t = 10.73, Fcont. = 115.1 >Fcrit. = 16.26), and 
there was a significant age by category interaction (t = -6.33; Fcont. = 40.1 > Fcrit. = 
37.59, p = 0.01). Equivalent proportions of perceptual responses were produced to 
animals and vehicles and both significantly outnumbered the perceptual responses 
produced to fruits/vegetables (animals: t = 4.09, Fcont. = 16.73 > Fcrit. = 16.26; 
vehicles: (F = 4.28, Fcont. = 18.32 > Fcrit = 16.26).  
The factual responses made to animals and vehicles, shown in Figure 4c, 
significantly exceeded factual responses to fruit/vegetables and implements (t = 22.4; 
Fcont. = 501.8 > Fcrit. = 16.26). There was also a significant category by age 
interaction (t = -6.6; Fcont. = 43.16 > Fcrit. = 37.59, p = 0.01), in which responses to 
animals and vehicles declined over age relative to the other categories, but 
comparisons within these groupings were insignificant.   
The functional responses to implements, shown in Figure 4d, significantly 
exceeded the functional responses to vehicles (t = 22.89; Fcont. = 524.0 > Fcrit. = 
16.26), and functional responses to vehicles significantly exceeded functional 
responses to animals and fruits/vegetables (t = -25.23; Fcont. = 636.6 > Fcrit = 16.26). 
Finally, equivalent proportions of action responses (see Figure 3e) were produced to 
implements and fruits/vegetables and, in both cases, these proportions of action 
responses significantly exceeded the proportions of action responses made to vehicles 
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(implements: t = 7.24; Fcont. = 52.4 > Fcrit. = 13.82; fruit/vegetables: t = 7.88; Fcont. 
= 62.1 > Fcrit. = 13.8). No action responses were produced to animals. 
 In summary, the use of a superordinate term distinguished between living and 
non-living things, as also did functional information. Functional information further 
separated implements from vehicles while perceptual knowledge distinguished 
implements from all other categories. Finally, factual information separated animals 
and vehicles from implements and fruit and vegetables, while action knowledge 
separated animals from all other categories.  
 
Discussion: 
This cross-sectional study of the development of children’s responses to ‘What 
is a - ?’ questions has revealed bountiful data about the development of object 
knowledge in children aged from 3y 7m to 11 y 6m. Even the youngest children in the 
group were able to produce a variety of response types to different objects, and in 
sufficient numbers to warrant analysis. In total, the children produced equivalent 
numbers of perceptual to functional features, but higher proportions of perceptual to 
functional features were produced to living things than to nonliving things. In line 
with studies of adults that have used similarly narrow definitions of function (Farah 
and McClelland, 1991; McRae and Cree, 2002), the children produced greater 
numbers of perceptual than functional features to living things (in a ratio of 7 to 1), 
and roughly equivalent ratios of to non-living things; although, unlike the adult data, 
the children responses showed a slight advantage to functional knowledge (in a ratio 
of 1 perceptual to 2 functional responses). Thus, at this level of analysis, the 
children’s data provide particularly strong support for the perceptual-functional 
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hypothesis of category-specific disorders, first proposed by Warrington and Shallice 
(1984).  
However, when functional features were combined with actions and factual 
knowledge, these greatly outnumbered the proportions of perceptual responses 
obtained for both non-living and for living things. Non-perceptual responses 
dominated both categories in ratios of 3 perceptual to 4 non-perceptual features to 
living things, and 7 non-perceptual to 2 perceptual to nonliving things. These findings 
support those of previous studies that have manipulated the relative proportions of 
perceptual to functional features by varying the breadth of definitions of object 
function (Caramazza and Shelton,1998; Garrard et al, 2001; McRae and Cree, 2002). 
Together, they show that although perceptual properties outnumber functional 
properties to living things, they are not the most salient property overall, in contrast to 
the predictions of the perceptual-functional hypothesis. At this level of analysis 
however, functional responses continue to appear to be the hallmark of non-living 
things. 
In contrast to our findings, studies of children’s definitions have typically 
reported a predominance of functional responses in object definitions (Litovitz, 1977; 
Wehren, De Lisa, and Arnold, 1981; McGregor et al, 2002). In part, this may reflect 
differences in the range of information deemed to be ‘functional’. Our definition of 
function (defined as ‘what an object is used for’) was narrower than that of McGregor 
et al (2002) and Wehren et al (1981), although not of Litowitz (1977).  In addition, 
different proportions of perceptual and functional responses may reflect differences in 
the balance of the categories represented in the stimuli. Artefacts have tended to 
dominate the stimuli in studies with children: for example, sixteen artefacts and four 
living things were presented by McGregor et al, (2002); 14 artefacts and 1 living thing 
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were presented by Wehren et al (1981); and artefacts dominate the early definitional 
questions contained in the WIPPSI and WISC-R, used by Litovitz (1977). Thus it is 
perhaps not surprising that functional responses have been found to outnumber 
perceptual responses in these studies.  
 Like McRae and Cree (2002), we found that individual categories produced 
different profiles of perceptual and functional features in the children’s data.  Both 
studies found that animals and fruits and vegetables generated many perceptual 
features and few functions, and both McRae and Cree’s ‘collection of nonliving 
things’ and our category of ‘implements’ produced many functions but fewer 
perceptual features. We found in addition, that animals were characterised by high 
proportions of factual and perceptual responses and an absence of action responses 
(defined as ‘what is done to objects in the process of using them’). In contrast, fruits 
and vegetables were characterised by high levels of action and perceptual responses, 
and low proportions of factual responses. Action responses (such as ‘you eat it’ and 
‘you bite it’) were particularly common to fruits and vegetables in very early 
childhood, but decreased markedly over age in proportion to other response types. 
The higher proportion of factual responses to animals than fruit/vegetables 
presumably reflects the fact that people in general possess more information about 
animals; while the lower proportion of action responses to animals than 
fruits/vegetables probably reflects the fact that relatively few animals have purposes 
for people: we considered that our sample included just four examples of such 
animals (cow, camel, donkey and llama).  
 Implements were characterised by outstandingly high proportions of 
functional responses. These proportions were consistent across age, and significantly 
outnumbered proportions of action responses, except in the youngest age group. 
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Actions also exceeded perceptual and factual responses, indicating the practical nature 
of implements. In contrast, vehicles were characterised by relatively low levels of 
functional responses (which did not differ in proportion from perceptual and factual 
responses) and even lower proportions of actions, which differed from all other 
response types. Surprisingly, even generic action responses, such as ‘you drive it’ to 
motor vehicles, generally did not occur.     
As the data reported above suggest, it is difficult to find features that 
characterise either a particular category of object or a broader domain of living or 
non-living thing. Rather, as Garrard et al (2001) observed, it is the criss-crossing of 
feature types across members of a category that sets the category apart. Relatively low 
levels of perceptual responses distinguish implements from all other categories; 
superior proportions of factual properties distinguish animals (cf Garrard et al, 2001) 
and vehicles from fruit/vegetables and implements; while the absence of action 
responses distinguish animals from all other categories. Only object function 
differentiates significantly between living and non-living things; and even then 
significantly more functional features were produced to implements than to vehicles. 
Furthermore, only in the case of implements did the proportions of functional features 
significantly supersede other feature types. Thus, although function appears to 
characterise implements, there is little evidence from this study, that the remaining 
categories can be differentiated on the basis of particular features.  
These data undermine the view that the classic distinction between living and non-
living things, observed in cases of neuropsychological impairment, is based upon the 
loss or retention of particular types of features (Warrington and Shallice, 1984; 
Warrington and McCarthy, 1987). Perceptual knowledge does not dominate the 
responses made by children to living things, although it is the case that perceptual 
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properties are the only feature on which both animals and fruit/vegetables scored 
highly. Neither does knowledge of function dominate responses to non-living things: 
only to implements was this property the most salient. However, two hypotheses put 
forward by McCarthy and Warrington (1988) to explain category-specific differences 
in performance across small and large nonliving things were upheld by this study. 
Significantly more action responses, and significantly fewer perceptual responses, 
were elicited to implements than to vehicles, and perceptual responses to vehicles 
were at least equivalent in number to those given to categories of living things.  
Superordinate responses do however distinguished between categories of objects. 
While proportions of superordinate responses increased over age relative to other 
response types, these differed strikingly across living and nonliving things. Even 
among the youngest age groups, almost 20% of the children’s responses to animals 
and to fruit and vegetables consisted of a superordinate term. Marked increases in the 
use of superordinates for both categories were observed between age groups 4y7m-
5y6m and 5y7m to 6y6m, which may reflect the influence of schooling. Not until the 
children reached the age of 8y7m did the proportion of superordinate responses for 
vehicles reach the 20% level, and implements did not attain this level until the 
children reached the age of 11y7m.  
The different use of superordinate terms to categories of living and nonliving 
things, found in the children’s data, fits well with a number of other findings: that 
overlapping attributes define living (but not nonliving) things at the superordinate 
level (Rosch et al 1976); that normal adult are more likely to provide superordinate 
terms to living than non-living things (McRae and Cree, 2002); and that people with 
semantic disorders are more likely to respond with a superordinate term to living than 
non-living things (Funnell and De Mornay Davies, 1996; Tyler and Moss, 1997). The 
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results of this study indicate that the different use of superordinate terms across 
categories have their origins in early childhood. 
Studies of the development of superordinate responses in childhood have 
emphasised the relatively late emergence of these response types over age (Watson, 
1995; Snow, 1990; Johnson and Anglin, 1995). However, our results show that the 
incidence of superordinate responses at any particular age depends upon how well a 
particular set of objects ‘afford’ a superordinante term (cf Garrard, Lambon Ralph, 
Hodges and Patterson, 2001). Categories of living things elicited superordinate 
responses from a very early age and were much more frequent than superordinate 
responses to either implements or vehicles. Thus, our prediction that categories of 
artefacts should produce superordinate responses based upon associations of shared 
motor patterns (cf Rosch et al, 1976) was not supported.  
Nevertheless, a good number of superordinate responses were produced by 
older children to tools (ie hammer, chisel, saw and spanner), while very few were 
elicited by some other implements, (ie, binoculars, camera, grater, and microscope), 
indicating the presence of sub-groups within the category. Similarly, while water-craft 
in particular attracted a good number of superordinate responses in the vehicle 
category, others attracted virtually none. Thus categories of implements and vehicles 
appeared to contain a heterogeneous collection of objects, in contrast to biological 
categories that form more homogeneous groupings (cf Rosch et al, 1976). In 
consequence, when the incidence of superordinate responses is compared across 
categories of living and non-living things, it is unlikely that like is being compared 
with like. 
Children below the age of ten years have been considered to be unlikely to 
produce the ‘best’ object definitions composed of a superordinate term and a specific 
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qualifying statement (Litowitz, 1977; Benelli, Johnson and Anglin, 1995; Kurland and 
Snow, 1997), perhaps because young children find it difficult to focus on both the 
form and the content of definitions (McGhee Bidlack, 1991).  In our study however, 
some young children aged between 3 years 7months and 4 years 6 months were able 
to produce such definitions to animals and fruit/vegetables, and some children aged 
5y7m to 6y6m were able to do this for vehicles; only the older children aged 7y7m to 
8y6m could produce these definitions to implements. Clearly some children can 
produce such definitions from an early age, and the likelihood of doing so appears to 
vary partly with mental capacity, as measured by differences in age, and also by the 
degree to which an object affords a category label. 
  In summary, our study has supported the expectation that adult conceptions of 
objects have their origins in childhood. Our results correspond well with adult studies, 
despite the different methods that have been used to elicit and analyse responses. 
Perceptual responses and functional responses can both be found in high proportions 
from the youngest age, indicating that children as young as 3 to 4 years can form 
categories containing conceptual information, although this is not thought to be the 
case in very early infancy (Mandler, 1987). Superordinate responses are most salient 
to the living categories and were made by some of the youngest children, questioning 
the view that the use of superordinate terms develops at a relatively late age. 
Perceptual responses are more salient than functional properties to animals, 
fruit/vegetables and vehicles, although they are not the most salient property overall. 
Functional responses are particularly salient to manipulable objects. Action responses 
are salient to manipulable objects and to fruit and vegetables in the youngest age 
groups, but are notably absent responses to animals. Factual responses are most 
numerous to animals and vehicles. Since information about function, action, and fact 
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has been found to dissociate across categories, these properties must reflect different 
mental constructs. Classifications that group together these response types will 
therefore miss potentially important distinctions.  
Finally, although perceptual knowledge is generally distinguished from 
conceptual knowledge in theories of object representation (Miller and Johnson-Laird, 
1976; Johnson Laird, 1983; Jackendoff, 1987), the fact that the children’s 
conceptualisations of objects included significant amounts of perceptual information 
supports the view that, whatever the underlying representation, ‘knowing what an 
object looks like is part of knowing what an object is’ (Jackendoff, 1987; McGregor 
et al, 2002).  
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